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ANTITRUST PER SE OR RULE OF REASON:
THE RIGHT OF ENGINEERS TO FORMULATE
BIDDING POLICIES AS A LEARNED PROFESSION-
NATIONAL SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS V. UNITED STATES
One reason Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act was to assure a
system that would allocate and utilize resources most efficiently. I In perti-
nent part, the Act prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in re-
straint of trade. 2 Neither statute nor legislative history adequately defines
"restraint of trade." 3  Early decisions narrowly construed the legislation, '
but a need for flexibility in applying the Act resulted in judicial formulation
of a standard of reasonableness to be applied in assessing the impact of an
alleged restraint.5 Thus, certain activities that initially would have been
1. One method by which the Act has achieved maximum economic value for consumers is
through the application of per se rules of illegality to combinations that restrain trade. As Pro-
fessor Bork of Yale University explained:
[Dleviant strains in the law have usually been characterized by a willingness to give
operative significance to conflicting aims, such as the welfare of particular producer
groups. Failure by both courts and commentators to recognize the existence of
separate themes, defined roughly by the values they implement, has been responsi-
ble for much of the confusion for which antitrust law is so justly noted.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE
L.J. 775, 781-82 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bork].
2. The Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceed-
ing one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
Since its enactment, there have been few amendments to the Act, the force and effect of the
law being substantiated by judicial decisions.
3. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978).
4. Bork, supra note 1, at 785.
5. Id. Further, in drafting the Act, the legislators expressed a preference for free enter-
prise and unrestricted competition. 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2459, 2461, 2462 (1890) (remarks of
Sen. Sherman); Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1956); United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944). Congress also invested the federal
courts with a new jurisdiction to create a federal common law of antitrust within the general
purview of prior common law. 21 CONG. REc. 2456, 2461 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1896), and Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), are good illustrations of judicial interpretation of the Sherman
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prohibited presently may survive judicial scrutiny if found to be neither a
per se violation of the Act nor an unreasonable restraint of trade under the
rule of reason test. Accordingly, often a defendant will attempt to dem-
onstrate that a challenged restraint is not unreasonable and therefore not a
violation of the Act. 6
Recently, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States7
(NSPE), the Supreme Court affirmed the District of Columbia District
Court's finding of a per se violation of the Act. Although the defense argued
that the Society, as a learned profession, was entitled to preferential treat-
ment in deference to the members' specialized knowledge, the Court re-
jected its contention that application of the rule of reason could be advanced
in a defense which asserts that, .given circumstances peculiar to a profession,
competition itself may be unreasonable. 8 The majority then used the case
as a forum for a discussion of the rule of reason, 9 but failed to articulate
specific standards with which to guide future applications of the rule.
This Note discusses the Court's attempt in NSPE to clarify the rule of
reason. 10 It will demonstrate that the Court's treatment of alleged antitrust
Act. In Trans-Missouri, Justice Peckham articulated the rule of reason:
Proceeding, however, upon the theory that the statute did not mean what its plain
language imported, and that it intended in its prohibition to denounce as illegal
only those contracts which were in unreasonable restraint of trade, the courts below
have made an exhaustive investigation as to the general rules which guide courts in
declaring contracts to be void as being in restraint of trade, and therefore against
the public policy of the country.
166 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added).
Justice White, ten years after his dissents to the early Peckham opinions articulating the rule
of reason analysis, wrote the majority opinion in Standard Oil. Justice White said:
Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a statute, it follows
that it was intended that the rule of reason which had been applied at the common
law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the
statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining
whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong
against which the statute provided.
221 U.S. at 60. See note 58 infra. See also text accompanying notes 26-30 infra.
6. 435 U.S. at 689.
7. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
8. Id. at 696.
9. Id. at 696-99.
10. Id. at 681. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), in
which the Court stated that the balancing test is the essence of the rule of reason analysis: "The
probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of
those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences." Id. at 50 n.16.
It is achieved by "analyzing the facts peculiar to business, the history of the restraint and the
reasons why it was imposed." Id. at 692. See also note 27 infra.
In Note, The Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations after Goldfarb: Reformulating
the Learned Professions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1047 [hereinafter
cited as DUKE NOTE], the author points out that, with respect to the "new" learned profession
exemption, "[ainticompetitive activities, with the possible exception of price fixing, will be sub-
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violations, in the learned professions arena, has been reduced to an ex-
peditious characterization of the activity early in the analysis, thus preclud-
ing a full examination of any potential benefits. Finally, this Note will indi-
cate that the current trend away from application of the rule of reason to a
learned profession has been particularly unjust to those professions. The fail-
ure to accord them special treatment prevents a flexible approach to consid-
erations, both pro and anticompetitive, often inherent in pronouncements of
an organization. 11
FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY, AND NATURE OF THE CASE
The United States brought a civil antitrust action seeking an injunction
against the National Society of Professional Engineers (Society) for anticom-
petitive practices12 resulting from members' adherence to section 11(c) of
the Society's Canon of Ethics. 13 The canon prohibited member engineers
from supplying price information to prospective customers, 14 which limited
the selection of an engineer to considerations of reputation and
background. 15 The Government alleged that this practice suppressed price
competition among member engineers and deprived customers of the ben-
efits of free and open competition.
16
ject to a rule of reason analysis balancing their direct contribution to the public benefit against
their harmful anticompetitive effects." id. at 1068.
11. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977).
12. The Government's complaint alleged that the canon required that there be no price
bidding until after a prospective client has selected an engineer for the proposed project. It
alleged that, as a consequence, price competition among members had been suppressed and
customers were denied the benefits of free and open competition. 435 U.S. at 682-84.
13. The canon, adopted in July 1964, read:
Section 11. The Engineer will not compete unfairly with another engineer by
attempting to obtain employment or advancement or professional engagements by
competitive bidding.
(C) He shall not solicit or submit engineering proposals on the basis of competi-
tive bidding. Competitive bidding for professional engineering services is defined as
the formal or informal submission, or receipt, of verbal or written estimates of costs
or proposals in terms of dollars,. man days of work required, percentage of construc-
tion cost, or any other measure of compensation whereby the prospective client
may compare engineering services on a price basis prior to the time that one en-
gineer, or one engineering organization, has been selected for negotiations. The
disclosure of recommended fee schedules prepared by various engineering societies
is not considered to constitute competitive bidding. An Engineer requested to sub-
mit a fee proposal or bid prior to the selection of an engineer or firm subject to the
negotiation of a satisfactory contract, shall attempt to have the procedure changed to
conform to ethical practices, but if not successful he shall withdraw from considera-
tion for the proposed work. These principles shall be applied by the Engineer in
obtaining the services of other professions.
14. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C.
1975).
15. Id.
16. 435 U.S. at 684.
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The Society claimed that the canons protected the public interest by
minimizing the risks attendant upon inadequate engineering design. 17 The
District Court for the District of Columbia characterized the canon's prohibi-
tion of competitive bidding as price fixing. 18 Consequently, it held that
there was no need to consider the facts that the Society offered in justifica-
tion of the canon, as price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.19
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court,
but went beyond a mere examination of the canon and its operation in
fact. 20 The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision and stated
that mere "price fixing" was not the only practice condemned as a per se
violation, but that rather, any "combination formed for the purpose and with
-the effect of fixing or stabilizing prices is illegal per se."21
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 22 to consider the petitioner's con-
tention that the district court erred in finding that an ethical canon prohibit-
ing price bidding by engineers was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.2 3
The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions not to examine the factual
basis for the Society's proffered justification. 24 Further, it noted that a de-
fense based on the contention that competition among engineers was con-
trary to the public interest was insufficient to support the application of a
rule of reason analysis. 25
THE NATURE OF ANTITRUST ANALYSES
As the Supreme Court recounted in NSPE, there exist two complementary
categories of antitrust analyses. 26 Manifestly anticompetitive conduct 2 7 is
17. Brief for Petitioner at 25. The Society argued that selection of engineers by competence
rather than by fee bidding is also in accordance with United States Government policy:
[R]egular competitive negotiation . . . does not provide an optimum method of pro-
curing [architectural/engineering] services for the Government or anyone else ....
[S]avings . . . reflected . . . means that the Government would tend to obtain lower
quality plans and specifications which could mean high construction and mainte-
nance costs and, generally, lower quality building and other facilities.
Id.
See also id. at 23, in which it was pointed out that selection of engineers by competence is a
method preferred by the engineers themselves. Those who testified stated that they refused to
engage in fee bidding because it was not sound engineering practice. An engineer's authority to
make such an observation is based on a premise that engineering is a learned profession, pos-
sessing certain characteristics, i.e., "a body of specialized and organized knowledge, a group of
practitioners, an established intellectual discipline, and traditional ethical principles." Id. at 7.
18. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. at 460.
19. Id. See text accompanying notes 26-39 infra.
20. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
21. Id. at 983.
22. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 434 U.S. 815 (1977).
23. 404 F. Supp. at 461.
24. 435 U.S. at 681.
25. Id. at 684.
26. Id. at 692.
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considered a per se violation. Such an activity is not entitled to further
examination for any redeeming purpose or motive. 28 Courts have no obli-
gation to document the precise harm caused and no anticompetitive legiti-
mate business intention will serve as an excuse. 29 Broad per se generaliza-
tions about particular commercial practices are based on prior experiences 30
that have established with certainty the types of acts to be proscribed. A per
se finding of unreasonableness therefore relieves the court of burdensome
investigatory requirements.
Where an activity's anticompetitive effects can be determined only after
complex analysis, the rule of reason is applied. 31 Under this analysis, the
court evaluates a defendant's assertion of a legitimate reason for any conduct
which is not overtly or admittedly anti-competitive. The determination of
the reasonableness of a certain activity may vary according to the industries
27. See, e.g., Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1959) (discussion at note 29
infra).
28. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950). The
members of the Washington, D.C., Real Estate Board were charged with combining and con-
spiring, in violation of the Sherman Act, to fix commission rates for their services as brokers in
dealing with real property.
29. In Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court af-
firmed the district court's judgment that the railroads' preferential routing agreements violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The railroad required, in deeds to persons who owned land
originally granted to the railroad, that commodities produced or manufactured on such land be
shipped via Northern Pacific's lines, provided the rates were equal to competing carriers. The
Court noted:
[Tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved .. . in an effort to determine ...
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable ...
Id. at 5. The Northern Pacific Court cited as examples of per se unreasonableness: price fixing,
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); division of markets, United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899); group boycotts, Fashion Originators'
Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); and tying arrangements, International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356
U.S. at 5.
30. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977), the Court said
that the district court apparently tried to delineate between per se and non-per se situations on
the basis of whether or not there was a sale transaction or a non-sale transaction. Id. at 54. It
recognized that generalizations of per se rules provide guidelines for the business community
and minimize the burdens inherent in rule of reason trials. But it also realized that such advan-
tages do not justify the creation of per se rules. Id. at 50 n.16. If this were so, "all of antitrust
law would be reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an unintended rigidity in the law." Id.
31. 435 U.S. at 691. The Court stated that "the inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is
whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition." Id.
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involved. 32  Selected categories, such as learned professions, 33 have been
accorded special treatment 34 in consideration of unique attributes. 35  As a
result, when a professional association has engaged in an activity historically
classified as a per se violation, courts have deferred to the professionals'
specialized knowledge and have weighed the additional social, moral, or
economic factors that could have motivated the professionals in acting as
they did. 36  This has given learned professions the opportunity to present
evidence that is subjected to a rule of reason balancing test even though the
activity would be otherwise evaluated under per se rules. 37 Courts concede
that this special treatment is warranted because particular state regulations
imposed on such professions may be incompatible with certain competitive
practices of professional activities. 38  For example, professional recommen-
32. Congress has specifically exempted selected industries from the Sherman Act in provi-
sions of the United States Code. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1976) (Capper-Volstead Act,
agricultural cooperatives); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1013 (1976) (McCarran-Ferguson Act, insurance);
49 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (Reed-Bulwinkle Act, rail and motor carrier rate-fixing bureaus); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (1976) (newspaper joint operating agreements).
Latitude has also been granted to labor unions in the form of an exemption when the union
acts in its own self interest and does not combine with any non-labor group to achieve its end.
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Some special interest groups are
categorically exempted, such as agricultural and fishing marketing associations. Some practices
in banking and insurance industries, and export trade associations are also exempted. C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 42 (1959). Often public utilities, due to their com-
position as natural monopolies, will also be given latitude with respect to antitrust regulations.
Id.
33. By definition, professional societies, like trade associations, typically possess inherent
barriers to market entry. J. BURNS, A STUDY OF ANTITRUST LAwS 41 (1958). As a group of
individuals joined by common interests, such an association's exclusivity is a key factor in ac-
complishing mutual goals and benefits. Accordingly, many agreements essential to the creation
of trade (such as communications within an industry designed to promote its orderly function)
are not necessarily illegal simply because they incidentally restrain trade. Id. at 39.
34. The Supreme Court has noted that it is common to impose restraints upon the conduct
of business, such as those applied by the Chicago Board of Trade with respect to its members.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918). The Court supported the
defendant's appeal to shorten the working day or at least to minimize the most stressful period.
Id. at 241.
35. Brief for Petitioner at 7.
36. See DUKE NOTE, supra note 10, at 1051.
37. See Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1977). See also
note 113 infra.
38. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Sherman Act does not exclude
learned professions altogether. Rather, an accord must be reached between the need for profes-
sional regulation and the limiting dictates of antitrust. See generally Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977).
A justification for the learned profession exemption is found in the underlying purpose of the
Act itself: to free competition in business and commercial transactions. See 11 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 183, 196 (1977). The traditional argument for exempting professional activities from anti-
trust regulation is based on the rationale that competition is inconsistent with the practice of a
profession because the goal of professionals is to provide those services needed by the commu-
nity, rather than to generate profits.
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dations or guidelines that ban solicitation and advertising have been allowed
to survive where the public benefit outweighed the competitive harm. 39
In addition to giving special consideration to groups with particular attri-
butes, the Court also has attempted to shape the standards which define a
valid defense under the rule of reason. In an early decision, United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 40 Supreme Court Justice Douglas wrote a "per se"
opinion that rejected as a defense a need to eliminate "competitive
evils." 4 1  He stated that the law did not permit an inquiry into the reason-
ableness of price fixing agreements, despite an asserted economic justifica-
tion. 42 Similarly, the Court rejected a rule of reason analysis in NSPE, and
noted that the rule could not be invoked to justify activities that suppress
competition. 43 The Socony and NSPE decisions indicate that a challenged
restraint that has an economic impact, such as on prices, will be scrutinized
more closely at the initial labeling of the activity. Hence, if an activity is
characterized as a per se violation at the outset, a defense of reasonableness
will not stand, and a rule of reason analysis will not be applied. 44
THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IN NSPE
Before determining which of the two categories of antitrust analysis would
be applied, the NSPE Court attempted a threshold determination as to
whether the Society's canon amounted to price fixing. 45 An agreement to
fix prices is defined for purposes of antitrust analysis as an agreement that
"interfere[s] with the setting of price by free market forces." 46 Such an agree-
ment is illegal on its face and is a traditional per se violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act. 47 In NSPE, although the Court rejected the Govern-
ment's contention that the canon amounted to "price fixing as such,"' 48 it
This defense was pleaded in Goldfarb, in which a wholesale exemption for the legal profes-
sion was requested. In an often-quoted statement from United States v. Oregon State Medical
Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), the Court said: "[I]n some instances the State may decide that forms
of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a
profession." Id. at 336.
39. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-5(12) (1977). The original application of the rule of
reason was perceived by Justice Peckham to outlaw only those agreements having as their main
purpose the suppression of competition and to uphold those agreements where the elimination
of competition was merely collateral or incidental to a legitimate end the parties were pursuing.
Bork, supra note 1, at 789-90.
40. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
41. Id. at 220.
42. Id. at 224 n.59.
43. The Society argued that the restraint on price competition ultimately inures to the pub-
lic benefit because it prevents inferior work and insures ethical behavior. 435 U.S. at 693-94.
44. See note 54 infra.
45. 435 U.S. at 693-94.
46. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969). See note 100
infra.
47. DUKE NOTE, supra note 10, at 1062.
48. 435 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added).
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found that the agreement by which engineers refused to discuss prices was
obviously anticompetitive. 49 Therefore, although the Court did not place
the activity strictly within the confines of the per se category of price fixing
by defining the engineers' activity as price fixing, it nevertheless affirmed
the lower courts' findings of a per se violation and rejected any further con-
siderations that a rule of reason analysis would entail. By finding the canon
obviously anticompetitive and in restraint of trade on its face, the Court
relieved the Government of the evidentiary burden of demonstrating the
anticompetitive character of an agreement through the "elaborate industry
analysis,"5 0 which the rule of reason balancing test requires. 51 The result is
that the avoidance of extensive proof requirements correlatively lessens the
administrative burden on the courts.
In holding that the Society's agreement reflected an actionable restraint of
trade "on its face," the NSPE Court substantially lessened the Government's
initial burden. 52 The Society argued that the lower courts' perfuntory de-
terminations resulted in an incorrect application of the appropriate antitrust
standard. .3 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's use of per se
rules that focused on those practices that themselves work to restrain
trade, 54 as opposed to considering only the effects of the particular re-
49. Id. It is to be observed, however, that the Court tested the activity according to price
fixing standards. This is significant in supporting a contention that it was seeking an expeditious
determination of the controversy. Clearly, the conduct could have been considered a concerted
refusal to deal, which is also a per se violation. However, not all group refusals can be classified
as having as their purpose the increase of the group's profits. There could be legitimate
economic aims requiring a judicial examination to assess any other objectives other than in-
creased profits, such as social or moral considerations.
The leading case on group refusals to deal is Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). Textile manufacturers solicited agreements from buyers of mate-
rials that they would not deal in textiles that copied designs of other members of the Guild. The
Court upheld the findings of the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC had concluded that the
practices of the combination constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of the
Sherman Act.
50. 435 U.S. at 692.
51. Antitrust actions are often encumbered by each side's presentations to either establish or
refute the anticompetitive character of the challenged agreement. The dificulty of establishing
this element often causes an action to fail.
52. 435 U.S. at 686. If a per se violation is found, the evidence requirements are elimi-
nated. There are three fundamental per se violations of the Sherman Act: price fixing, market
division, and group refusals to deal. The Court pointed out that while the Society was not guilty
of price fixing as such, the agreement effectively acted as a ban on competitive bidding which is
illegal. 435 U.S. at 692, quoting United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333,
337 (1969), for the proposition that "an agreement that 'interfere[s] with the setting of price by
free market forces' is illegal on its face."
53. Brief for Petitioner at 50.
54. Several cases have been decided solely on the character of the restraint. These generally
involve per se violations of antitrust laws. For example, in United States v. National Ass'n of
Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950), the Court stated:
It is not for the courts to determine whether in particular settings price-fixing
serves an honorable or worthy end. An agreement, shown either by adherence to a
1148
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straints. 55 The Supreme Court has underscored the distinction between the
categories of an antitrust analysis, and has agreed that it is the result of the
restraint that is at issue, not the method. 56 It Affirmed the finding of a per
se violation, however, on the basis that the ban on competitive bidding was
overtly anticompetitive. It then followed a line of precedent that has refused
to honor agreements effecting a direct and immediate restraint on interstate
price schedule or by proof of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum
price, is itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was designed to
serve.
Id. at 489.
In American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), the Court found the AMA
guilty of a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The AMA had expelled
members who had participated in a free clinic, contrary to their rules of ethics. The Court held
that it was irrelevant whether the conspiracy was aimed at restraining or destroying competi-
tion, or had as its purpose a restraint of the free availability of medical or hospital services in
the market. Id. at 529.
55. In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 555 F.2d at 982, the court of
appeals held that sound antitrust doctrine does not require the balancing of benefits accruing
from competitive restraints in a cost-benefit analysis. Usually, in examining the end result, as
opposed to the method of restraining, the court will focus on the actual harm suffered by the
consumer.
56. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Court noted: "[T]he real
point is not the instrumentality or the scheme used to suppress the competition, but whether
competition is thus suppressed and trade restrained and monopolized." Id. at 23. The Court
found that combinations of businesses that refined crude oil and shipped the products interstate
were an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 75-77. The Court held that the trust agreement
had the effect of forming a monopoly, which had deleterious results on competition in violation
of the Sherman Act. Id. The remedy was dissolution of the combination by court order.
Justice White's classic enunciation of the main premise of the rule of reason analysis was
presented in Standard Oil. Although the Court found that the combination could not withstand
the Sherman Act challenge, the decision survived as the framework for application of the balanc-
ing test.
[A]s the contracts or acts embraced in the provision were not expressly defined,
since the enumeration addressed itself simply to classes of acts, those classes being
broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract or combination which could be
made concerning trade or commerce or the subjects of such commerce, and thus
caused any act done by any of the enumerated methods anywhere in the whole field
of human activity to be illegal if in restraint of trade, it inevitably follows that the
provision necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which required that some
standard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the prohibi-
tions contained in the statute had or had not in any given case been violated.
Id. at 60.
Justice Harlan's dissent in this case emphasized Justice Peckham's literal interpretation re-
quirement. If the courts were allowed to determine which contracts in restraint of trade were
illegal, and which were reasonable and therefore legal, judicial legislation would result. Id. at
88.
In NSPE, the Court tried to reconcile the method and result approaches by saying that the
rule of reason does not mean that any argument may support a challenged restraint because it is
in the "realm of reason." 435 U.S. at 688. Rather, the Court stressed that the true function of
the rule is to focus on the impact the restraint has on competitive conditions. Id.
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commerce 57 by suppressing competition. 58 The Court also noted that
where an agreement's competitive effect can be ascertained only after a
complex analysis, the rule of reason would be applied.59 The decision dem-
onstrated that the mere existence of negative effects of competition is not
sufficient to mandate the application of the rule's balancing test. 60
Additionally, although the Society's status as a learned profession appar-
ently was instrumental in garnering review by the Supreme Court, the
Court declined to consider further the Society's proffered justifications. The
district court refused to consider the possible consequences with which the
Society was faced in deciding whether to adopt the canons. The Supreme
Court summarily determined that the lower court was correct in refusing to
consider any factual basis for the Society's justification before rejecting it. 6 1
The majority apparently was not influenced by the status of the engineers,
and held that notwithstanding the engineers' rank as a learned profession, 62
57. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785, 786 (1975), the Court conceded
that there may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and are therefore
outside the Sherman Act. This Note will not discuss the interstate character of an activity caus-
ing it to fall initially within the scope of the Sherman Act, as the Society did not pursue it as a
defense. Generally, however, the rule is that congressional power to regulate exists when con-
duct exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. In Boddicker v. Arizona State
Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 1977), in a discussion of dental fee schedules, the
court noted that an interstate violation must be found. The validity of a fee schedule may
depend upon its relation to activities having only a de minimis effect upon commerce. As with
other learned professions, however, "[flrequently the practice of law entails the making of deci-
sions in one state which significantly affect commercial transactions in others." Branca & Stein-
berg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 UCLA
L. REV. 475, 479 (1977).
In United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. at 459, the court
dismissed the defense that the engineer's activities did not fall within the scope of the Act by
not having a sufficiently interstate personality. It said that, due to their nature, engineering
services are at the "very backbone of the major portion of the nation's commerce." Id. at 460.
58. In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Justice Peckham
stated that it was not enough that the mere tendency of the contract worked to restrain compe-
tition; he would uphold those contracts in which the elimination of competition was only collat-
eral and incidental to a legitimate end the parties were pursuing:
[W]here the direct and immediate effect of a contract or combination among par-
ticular dealers in a commodity is to destroy competition between them and others,
so that the parties to the contract or combination may obtain increased prices for
themselves, such contract or combination amounts to a restraint of trade in the
commodity, even though contracts to buy such commodity at the enhanced price
are continually being made.
Id. at 244. In Addyston, the defendants entered into an agreement prohibiting competition
between them within a specified area with regard to the manufacture and sale of cast-iron pipe.
The stated purpose of the combination was to enhance price. Id. at 243. Justice Peckham estab-
lished price fixing and market divisions as per se offenses against the antitrust laws. See Bork,
supra note 1, at 783.
59. 435 U.S. at 697.
60. Id. at 693-94.
61. Id. at 681.
62. Id.
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the defense relied upon by the Society could not support a rule of reason
analysis. 63 In reproach of the Court's failure to consider the engineersI
learned standing, Justice Blackmun asserted in a concurring opinion that
"there may be ethical rules which have a more than de minimis anticompeti-
tive effect and yet are important in a profession's proper ordering." 64 Thus,
a restraint practiced by members of a learned profession might survive
scrutiny under a rule of reason analysis even though the same restraint
would be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context. Jus-
tice Blackmun also found that the Society's ethical canon was overly
broad. 65 He was unable, however, to approve the Court's intimation that
"any ethical rule with an overall anticompetitive effect promulgated by a
professional society is forbidden under the Sherman Act."- 66  Although he
did not indicate that a rule of reason had to be applied, he stated that
Goldfarb left the Court broader flexibility in applying the Act to self-
regulating professions than was exhibited by this decision. 67
The Society contended that the canon's price discussion prohibition was
reasonable because competition among professional engineers was contrary
to the public interest. 68 Specifically, the Society maintained that the com-
petitive pressure resulting from awarding work to the lowest bidder would
compel engineers to sacrifice quality and safety precautions, 69 thereby
jeopardizing public health, safety, and welfare. 70 The Society suggested
that a rule of reason analysis required the examination of an activity, al-
though it may have an anticompetitive facade, 71 for potential benefits. 72
63. Id.
64. Id. at 700 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 699.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 684. See also notes 32, 33, & 38 supra.
69. Id. at 685.
70. Id.
71. Brief for Petitioner at 28. The Society had asked the Court to consider its evidence
demonstrating that to allow competitive bidding on projects affecting the public sector (and
hence public safety) would cause engineers to underbid each other to a point where subse-
quent compliance with the quoted price would result in inferior workmanship and the use of
substandard materials. Similarly, the "Call" rule of the Board of Trade prohibited members
from bidding at a price other than that established on the close with respect to transactions
concerning commodities "to arrive" (i.e., those in transit to Chicago), during the hours between
the closing of one business day and the opening of the next. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The "true test" of illegality was first applied here by Justice Bran-
deis and has been used recently in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Historically, antitrust cases have examined the activities engaged in by the offending party, as
opposed to any meretricious consequences that might result. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Bod-
dicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977). In Goldfarb, the Court
decided that the Sherman Act applied to certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers and denied
the Virginia Bar an exemption for professional fee control activities. 421 U.S. at 493. The Bod-
dicker court stated that the challenged practice must serve the public interest in order to over-
come its anticompetitive effect. 549 F.2d at 632. Finally, in Continental TV., the Court held
11511979]
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The Court rejected the defense and held that the purpose of a rule of
reason analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of a
restraint, not to decide whether a policy that -affects competition may have
legitimate public or industrial interests at its core. 73 While the Court noted
that special considerations often are afforded learned professions such as the
Society, 74 it did not specifically discuss the limits and relevant considera-
tions of granting an exemption. The Court's conclusion suggested that the
Society could adopt some other ethical guideline to achieve the desired ob-
jective of avoiding deceptively low bids. 75
Finally, it is paradoxical that the Court acknowledged that professional
services and the nature of their competition differ from other business serv-
that a departure from the rule of reason analysis must be based on demonstrable economic
effect. 433 U.S. at 58-59.
72. Brief for Petitioner at 21. The engineers argued that compliance with the Government's
request would increase engineering costs. Because several engineering firms would be required
to commit much of their resources to complete a bid, covering the costs of such efforts would
necessitate charging higher prices.
73. 435 U.S. at 692.
74. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1918). The
Court stated that it is common to impose restraints upon the conduct of business as the Board
of Trade did with respect to its members. Id. at 241. In this case, the Court supported an
appeal to "shorten the working day or, at least, limit the period of most exacting activity." Id.
The Court also considered the motive behind the restraining activity: "This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences." Id. at
238.
75. Id. at 696, citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975). The
Goldfarb Court, however, left room for special treatment of learned professions:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a busi-
ness is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates
the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the
professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another con-
text, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the
one with which we are confronted today.
421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
The Goldfarb "situation" concerned the inability of individuals in need of a title examination,
a prerequisite to concluding a real estate transaction, to find a lawyer who would perform the
service for a lower fee than that quoted in the recommended fee schedule published by the
county bar. The Court found that the industry-wide adherence constituted price fixing, and that
status as a learned profession did not automatically exempt the bar association from the scope of
the Sherman Act. Id. at 781, 783, 787. This case marks the commencement of an apparent
trend to make learned professions vulnerable to the requirements of compliance with antitrust
rules under the Sherman Act. See generally Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Boddicker
v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of NSPE's impact
on the learned profession exemption, see Note, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 260 (1978).
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ices, 76 yet it required that the same standards be met by the engineers as
any other group, professional or not, that perpetrates restraints on trade. 77
The difficulty of reconciling the need for according learned professions spe-
cial considerations with the need to circumscribe economic disparities caused
Justice Blackmun to question whether, in light of their unique personalities,
enough latitude has been given to professional associations with respect to
antitrust litigation. 78
COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS
The analysis undertaken in NSPE to determine whether the engineers'
ethical standards of conduct constituted Sherman Act violations represents
the Court's disposition to apply a per se approach rather than a rule of
reason analysis when reviewing intraprofession regulations. Such an ap-
proach, by characterizing restrictive activities in per se terms, favors an ex-
peditious judicial determination, reduces the plaintiff's initial burden of prov-
ing a violation and limits the available defense. Alternatively, the rule of
reason, which has enjoyed a sporadic popularity in its application to learned
professions, 79 is currently in disfavor with the Court, due to the extensive
evidentiary requirements it entails. The seminal case contouring the rule of
reason analysis is Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 80 and it remains
convincing precedent for the application of the rule to cases involving the
pronouncements of organizations in specialized professions.
76. 435 U.S. at 699.
77. Id. at 696. The Court indicated that the ethical canon effectively excludes competition,
because there is adherence by virtually all engineers. Id. The Society had specified that the
canon was appropriately limited only to those projects where the public would be endangered if
the principle was disregarded. Brief for Petitioner at 15. They argued further that competition
was not eliminated, because a client dissatisfied with the fee proposed is free to choose and
negotiate with any additional number of engineers until the client and the engineer reach satis-
factory understanding. Id.
78. Justice Blackmun questioned whether the Court has left enough room for a "realistic
application of the Sherman Act to professional services." Indeed, it is this question that the
Court has yet to resolve. 435 U.S. at 701 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
79. See Bork, supra note 1, at 782.
80. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Justice Brandeis' decision
stands as a basis for the determination of antitrust cases on a rule of reason analysis:
[Tihe legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and
its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be




The Society maintained that the benefits required to be shown under a
rule of reason would have been discovered if the Court had adhered more
closely to the test formulated by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of
Trade. There, the Court upheld a rule prohibiting Board of Trade members
from making purchases between trading sessions at a price other than that
established by the closing bid. 81 The rule was found to be a reasonable
regulation, not inconsistent with the Sherman Act, for it merely restricted
the period of price-making and affected only a small part of all grain transac-
tions. 82 Justice Brandeis indicated that private regulation of competition
may be legitimately directed at both economic and non-economic goals.8 3
He suggested that courts should consider a number of relevant facts such as
the nature, effect, history, and reason for adopting the restraint and the
purpose or end sought. Additionally, he required an examination of the facts
peculiar to the business and its condition before and after the restraint was
in effect, as well as the evil believed to exist. 84
Similarly, NSPE represents a situation whereby the restrictive rule prom-
ulgated by an association was ostensibly in the public interest because its
objective was to minimize the risk that inferior engineering work would en-
danger safety. 85 The Chicago Board of Trade defense argued that their
rule not only enhanced competition, but that it also helped to break up a
monopoly among Chicago warehousemen. 86 The case illustrated that a
practice that superficially restrained trade could, when examined in light of
surrounding circumstances, actually promote competition. 87 Although the
Society relied on the Chicago Board of Trade decision in defense of its
canon, it was nonetheless denied the balancing test because its affirmative
defense confirmed rather than refuted the anticompetitive purpose and effect
of the agreement. 88 The NSPE decision demonstrates that the Court can
limit its examination of alleged anticompetitive restraints by characterizing or
labeling an activity early in the analysis. This restrictive definitional treat-
ment absolves the Court from the responsibility of applying the rule of
reason and results in an immediate determination of the controversy.
Recent Decisions in the Law
NSPE is preceded, however, by contemporary decisions revealing a trend
to limit the availability of the rule of reason. 89 Recently, codes prescribing
81. Id. at 237.
82. Id. at 235.
83. Id. at 240.
84. Id. at 238.
85. 435 U.S. at 681.
86. 246 U.S. at 238.
87. id.
88. 435 U.S. at 693.
89. See generally Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ethical behavior among members of learned professions have become suscep-
tible targets for antitrust attacks. In addition to curtailing the use of the rule
of reason, several of these cases also have restricted the availability of the
learned professions exemptions.
The landmark case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 90 established the
pattern for future antitrust determinations involving learned professions. 9 1
Although the Goldfarb Court did not apply a rule of reason analysis, neither
did it eliminate completely the impact of the learned profession exemption
thereunder. 92 Goldfarb did, however, indicate that activities directed
primarily at prices (such as fee controls) were outside the protection afforded
by the learned profession exemption. 93  Goldfarb, along with NSPE and
Bates, proves that few exceptions and deviations from the Sherman Act are
tolerated by deferring to the "heavy presumption against implicit excep-
tions." 94  The cases also reinforce the notion that a valid defense under a
rule of reason analysis requires a careful and accurate assessment of the in-
dustry involved. 95
90. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
91. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785-86 (1975).
92. Id. See also DUKE NOTE, supra note 10, at 1047, 1049.
93. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
94. The NSPE Court noted that sound antitrust doctrine does not require an examination of
any benefits that may accrue from competitive restraints. 435 U.S. at 696-97. It stated that
"[e]ven assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statu-
tory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad." Id. at 695.
Instead, an argument that competition should be balanced against the public good is properly
addressed to Congress, and therefore it does not warrant a rule of reason analysis.
This argument originated in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211
(1899), where Justice Peckham rejected the contention that some restraint of competition might
actually enhance the economic good to the benefit of the public. He stated that it did not
matter that trade continued and that contracts were made, albeit at higher prices, because the
effect was such that there was a restraint on trade at the expense of competition because of an
advanced price. Id. at 245.
Conversely, Justice Holmes, in Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904),
adhered to the position that the statute was to be included by interpretation in the terminology
as applied by common law. As Holmes stated: "The act says nothing about competition." Id. at
403. Holmes interpreted the Act to mean that only the extreme forms of competition would be
prohibited, not the cessation of competition among partners. Id. at 405.
95. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. at 1198.
With the rule of reason analysis, the courts make two inquiries: first, whether competi-
tion is actually increased as a result of the "restraint," and the effect the restrictions actually
have on the industry; and second, whether it is intended to capitalize distribution, or rather
promote the manufacturer's own interests. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Ap-
proach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1977). Posner indi-
cates that the attempt to apply a rule of reason analysis is an exercise in futility because few
cases have utilized the analysis as the determinative legal standard. Id. at 14.
The NSPE decision apparently adopts this belief. By rejecting the rule, the Court ignored the
possibility that the activities could, in fact, enhance competition, as the engineers claim. The
engineers point out that to require price bidding on projects will actually increase costs (hence
prices), an anti-competitive result. Brief for Petitioner at 21. However, in order for this result to
surface, the court would need to examine the evidence under a rule of reason analysis.
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Goldfarb tested the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
opinion articulated a basis for special treatment of learned professions under
antitrust laws. 96 The Virginia State Bar lost on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. The Court held that industry-wide adherence to a recom-
mended minimum fee schedule constituted price fixing. 97 By referring to a
mandatory fee schedule as price fixing, the Court's semantic delineation au-
tomatically placed the activity within the scope. of per se definitional treat-
ment. 98
Similarly, in United States v. Container Corp. of America,99 the Court
characterized as price fixing an activity that was merely an agreement to
exchange price information. 100 The Court applied a per se label to the
reciprocal exchange of price information between competitors in the corru-
gated container industry. 101 It held that because there were few sellers in
the market, the exchange of such data, by stabilizing prices, had an an-
ticompetitive effect. 102 The concerted action was held to have established a
combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, even though no
overt agreement to adhere to a price schedule was present. 103
The trend continued with the decision in Bates v. State Bar, 104 where the
Court held that the Arizona State Bar Association could not punish indi-
vidual lawyers who violated a state supreme court disciplinary rule prohibit-
ing the publication of advertisements. 105 The Bates Court held that the
This refutes Bork's broad definition of the rule of reason. He states that the essential spirit of
the rule is to condemn only those practices that are, on balance, inefficient in the economic
sense. Bork, supra note 1.
96. Id. at 788 n.17. See note 77 supra for the text of Goldfarb's note 17.
97. Id. at 781.
98. Id. at 787-88. The Court made a commercial versus noncommercial distinction, and
conceded that learned professions' noncommercial identity entitled them to preferential treat-
ment under antitrust laws. Activities of a trade which have commercial aspects, however, are
subject to a per se analysis under the Sherman Act. Thus, the primary step in a Sherman Act
analysis becomes the characterization of the activity as either business or commerce to ascertain
whether it was within the purview of the Act's authority.
99. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
100. Id. at 337. Sellers of corrugated containers agreed to furnish one another with price
information on request. The Court found that this resulted in a stabilization of prices, and thus
constituted a price fixing conspiracy, a per se violation. Id. at 335-37.
101. Id. at 337.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 334. Justice Marshall's dissent pointed out that per se rules always contain an
element of arbitrariness. He indicated that there is a formula to test for the correct implementa-
tion of the rules: the costs of the potential competitive harm plus the administrative costs of
determining in what situations the practice would be harmful must outweigh the potential ben-
efits that may result. Id. at 341.
104. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
105. The Court's focus was on the advertising restrictions that infringed on the attorney's first
amendment rights. Id. at 363. However, the Court noted the antitrust implications and held
that even though the association was granted regulating powers by the state, such state ap-
proved activity could not require subordination of federal law in the form of a state action
exemption. Id. at 362. See note 107 infra.
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practice of preventing individuals from advertising had a tendency to limit
competition. 106 The Court's acknowledgement of a state action exemption
for the bar association 107 exemplified that, although no per se violation of
the Sherman Act was found, there still remained a reluctance to engage in a
complex rule of reason analysis.
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 108 is another case analogous
to NSPE. While the Court stressed the importance of the effect of the re-
straint, its analysis focused on classifying the method of restraint. 109 The
questioned activity was allowed to stand in Continental T.V., but the deci-
sion indicated that a full rule of reason analysis was curtailed as a result of
the Courts' initial finding that the restraint was a vertical one reducing in-
trabrand competition. 110 This illustrates that the court preferred an ex-
peditious determination of the antitrust complaint in order to avoid the ex-
tended evidentiary requirements of a complete rule of reason analysis.
Finally, in Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Association,"' tying ar-
rangements 112 between local dental associations and the national association
were challenged by dentists who did not want to join the national group.
The ninth circuit court first held that the activities in question were subject
to a Sherman Act analysis, then it dealt with the question of the applicability
of the learned profession exemption. 113 Because it was not obvious to the
court that the arrangements at issue were designed to improve dental serv-
ices to the public, 114 the case was remanded for further consideration of the
106. Id. at 384.
107. Id. at 362-63. To be shielded from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine, a
state must compel the restrictive activity. The activity must be completely under the authority
of the state and supervised by state officials. Dougherty, An Antitrust Perspective on the Legal
Profession, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 638, 641 (1976).
108. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Continental TV., the Court applied a rule of reason analysis to
police anticompetitive effects resulting from non-price vertical restrictions. Id. at 59.
In overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), Continental TV.
criticized the Schwinn decision for "formalistic line drawing." The Continental T.V. Court held
that any departure from the rule of reason standard had to be based upon a demonstrable
economic effect. 433 U.S. at 58-59. In Schwinn, the Court found illegal a vertical distribution
restraint whereby a retailer was required to purchase bicycles only from a Schwinn-approved
territorial distribution scheme.
109. Id. at 58-59.
110. Id. at 54. The Court affirmed the holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that
nonsale vertical restrictions should be analyzed under a rule of reason test. Id. at 59. The result
provides some consideration for the possible benefits of interbrand competition. Id. at 54.
111. 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
112. A tying arrangement exists when a seller conditions the sale of a product upon a buyer's
agreement to purchase additionally needed items that are also available from other suppliers.
Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
113. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 630-32 (9th Cir. 1977). The
court relied on Goldfarb to determine the appropriateness of exempting the practice of dentis-
try from the Sherman Act.
114. Id. at 632.
1979] 1157
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
public service aspect and the extent to which the activities suppressed com-
petition. 115
The foundation of the Boddicker decision is that "a particular practice ...
must serve the purpose for which the profession exists, to serve the public;
...those which only suppress competition between practitioners will fail to
survive the challenge." 116 The court's implications with respect to the
interaction of learned professions and the Sherman Act suggested the proc-
ess by which the Supreme Court could have analyzed subsequent decisions.
Boddicker can be interpreted to mean that although a learned profession is
not necessarily exempt from the Act, it will be entitled to special treatment
with respect to allegedly anticompetitive activities. 117 When a challenged
restraint is found to be a per se violation, the rule of reason should be
applied to provide extra consideration of professional motives. 118 As NSPE
has shown, however, this approach has not been implemented, and the
ninth circuit, by compelling the application of the rule of reason balancing
test, stands as the exception to the trend.
Thus, the relief that the rule of reason provides has been denied by the
Court's cursory approach to antitrust complaints in recent years. By rejecting
the well-reasoned decision of the Chicago Board of Trade, the Court pre-
vents a full examination of the potential benefits that a learned profession
can provide if they are given an opportunity to present evidence which jus-
tifies their activities.
Impact
The most recent case dealing with the practices and policies of learned
professions, NSPE demonstrates the current trend to narrowly interpret the
Sherman Act where learned professions are involved. Finding a per se viola-
tion early in the scrutiny of a challenged restraint allows the Court to make
an immediate determination of the case, and thus to avoid the more probing
rule of reason analysis. The use of a per se language to define a challenged
activity adds a new dimension to antitrust litigation involving learned profes-
sions and their right to self regulation. 119 The fact that NSPE involved a
learned profession and a restraint of trade that was found to be a per se
violation is significant. It indicates that the Court, by failing to apply a rule
of reason analysis, ignored the value of any noneconomic benefits that such
115. Id. The court reversed a summary judgment and remanded so that further proceedings
could determine the validity of the defendant's claim that the arrangements in question actually
did promote improved dental services to the public.
116. Id.
117. See DUKE NOTE, supra note 10, at 1051.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1044, 1047. The restraining activity must not relate to price control or stabiliza-
tion, and the regulated profession must not be commercial to qualify for treatment under the
learned profession exemption.
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an analysis would afford. The use of the per se approach denies a full exami-
nation of the challenged activities. Further, the value of the special treat-
ment once accorded the professions will be completely nullified if the Court
refuses to weigh any additional factors that may have been considered at the
time the ethical guidelines were formulated.
In NSPE, the district court held that application of the rule of reason
would undermine the Goldfarb denial of total or partial exemptions for
learned professions. 120 Apparently, neither the nature of an occupation nor
any of its alleged public service aspects will guarantee sanctuary from the
Sherman Act. 121 Although the NSPE Court articulated a rule of reason
analysis, the affirmation of a per se violation left the parties in the same
relative positions as in the lower courts. 122
To determine the status of learned professions and their entitlement to
either a rule of reason analysis or an exemption, evaluations should focus on
grounds other than price. The NSPE Court, however, relied on analysis by
analogy with previous cases that necessarily focused on price. Addressing
only the price fixing aspects of a learned profession's challenged restraint
leads to spurious resolutions of these cases because any restraints that can be
categorized as price fixing will generally result in a finding of a per se viola-
tion.
The application of broad per se principles in antitrust law severely inhibits
the learned professions' freedom to formulate self-regulating ethical norms.
Although the NSPE appellate court indicated that it did not intend to imply
that there was no room in antitrust law for ethical rules of practice for
learned professions, it refused to sanction any rule that promoted anticom-
petitive conduct. 123 The NSPE decision not only advances the trend favor-
ing tighter control over the deviations that have been permitted under a rule
of reason analysis, but it also implicitly enlarges the scope of activities that
are to be regulated by the Sherman Act.
CONCLUSION
In NSPE, the Supreme Court was presented with a defense asserting that
anticompetitive practices engaged in by a learned profession could be jus-
tified under an application of the rule of reason. The Court denied the appli-
120. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. at 461.
121. Id. Congress did not intend the broad interpretation of the Sherman Act exemption
that would result if applied indiscriminately to learned professions. It may be urged that
competition is inconsistent with the practice of a profession, as the goal of a profession is to
provide services to the community. This illustrates the Goldfarb distinction between trades,
businesses, and other occupations. Such a differentiation is a prerequisite to a Sherman Act
analysis. The Sherman Act covers commercial activities, defined as those activities done in ex-
change for money, which includes most professional activities. DuKE NoTE, supra note 10, at
1055.
122. Brief for Petitioner at 40.
123. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Engrs, 555 F.2d at 982.
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cation of the rule, and thus furthered the trend to analyze learned profes-
sions' allegedly anticompetitive activities within the narrow confines of per se
terminology. Such an approach threatens the flexibility that is needed in
determining which activities have detrimental effects on competition.
In Boddicker, although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals laid a founda-
tion for according learned professions special treatment in traditional per se
areas, the Supreme Court rejected this more liberal approach when it de-
cided the NSPE controversy. The Court required a strict interpretation of
the Sherman Act, yet it failed to illustrate standards by which learned pro-
fessions could formulate guidelines for their standards of ethics. Hence, the
decision will cause learned professions to review the nature and extent of
any practices to which the entire profession adheres, yet it will not enable
them to fully ascertain those practices that will survive judicial scrutiny.
Susan J. Bevan
